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1. Introduction
Over the last two decades, the EU has adopted an active cohesion policy aimed at
reducing income disparities by subsidizing various types of investment programmes in the
Union's poorest regions through the so-called Structural Funds. This policy has often been
questioned on at least two different grounds. Perhaps the most common argument is that it has
not worked: since most of the assisted regions continue to be relatively poor in spite of these
programmes, EU grants are mostly a waste and should therefore be scrapped, or at least
severely curtailed. The second objection, which is often not explicitly stated but often lurks
behind calls for cuts in structural programmes, is based on the view that there is no reason
why the EU should engage in redistribution across its constituent territories.
The Commission's view on this last issue seems to be that such redistribution is necessary
because economic integration will tend to hurt the poorer regions of the Union by facilitating
the concentration of economic activity in certain core areas. As has already been said this
morning, this prediction seems to be based on an implicit assumption --that there are sharply
increasing returns to scale-- for which there is very little empirical support. Hence, I do not
think one can build a solid case for cohesion policies on the basis of the divergence predictions
of the "new" growth and trade theories.
But I do not think that is necessary either. In my view, the case for redistribution must
necessarily be based on political and equity considerations that have to do with what a
typical European citizen would consider fair and would be willing to support when it comes to
the budgetary policy of the Union. In this regard, I think we can validly extrapolate to the
Community level the revealed preferences of European electorates as manifested in the
policies of national governments-- provided we keep in mind that the typical taxpayer's
willingness to pay for redistribution drops rapidly with his or her distance to the
beneficiaries. While views about the desired level of redistribution vary widely across
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2member countries, my impression is that there is fairly broad support in Europe for a moderate
amount of budgetary solidarity. This consensus has been clearly visible in EU budget
practices, which have consistently resulted in sizable net transfers to the poorer member
countries,1 and has been incorporated into the Union's governing treaties in the form of an
explicit commitment to economic cohesion and financial solidarity among member states.
Hence, I will take it as given that a certain amount of redistribution within the EU is
desirable. Given this, it probably makes sense that at least some of this redistribution should
be achieved through conditional investment grants with "additionality" requirements and
some sort of quality filter to make sure that the funds flowing into the poorer territories are
effectively used to promote their development and are not diverted for consumption purposes.
This leaves me with two questions to which I will devote the bulk of my intervention. The
first one is whether we can reasonably expect that EU cofinancing of infrastructure and
training programmes will contribute to growth and convergence, and the second one has to do
with the level at which redistribution should be conducted. On the first issue, I am cautiously
optimistic. I will argue that supply-oriented regional policies can work in principle and have
actually worked quite well in the case of Spain, at least when judged in terms of their stated
objectives. My argument will be based on a brief review of the available empirical evidence
on the growth effects of investment in infrastructure and education (section 2), and on some
estimates of the impact of the Structural Funds in Spain (section 3). On the second issue, I will
argue that EU cohesion policy should be formulated at the national rather than at the
regional level, essentially because member states already have adequate systems for internal
redistribution.
2. Can regional policy work?
There is considerable disagreement among both academics and policymakers concerning
the effectiveness of the Structural Funds (and of regional policies in general) as instruments
for the reduction of income disparities. Many critics of these programmes argue that they
cannot be very effective on the grounds that billionaire expenditures over two decades have
not translated into clear progress in terms of regional convergence. An academic exposition of
this view can be found in a recent paper by Boldrin and Canova (2001). These authors examine
the evolution of the distribution of income across the EU regions over the last two decades and
find no evidence that convergence is taking place or that recipients of EU transfers (with the
exception of Ireland) have performed better than other regions. As the less formal versions of
the same argument, however, their analysis has the serious shortcoming that it fails to
control for any factors other than EU aid.
A recent paper by Ederveen, Gorter and Nahuis (2001) illustrates why the results obtained
in this manner can be extremely misleading. These authors estimate a series of convergence
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3equations relating growth in the European regions to initial income per capita and Structural
Fund transfers. When no additional variables are included in the equation, the estimated
coefficient on the transfers variable is negative and significant. When regional fixed effects
are introduced, however, the coefficient of EU transfers becomes positive and significant.
Upon reflection, these results should not be surprising. Since the recipients of EU aid are by
definition poor regions, the volume of aid works as a proxy for the omitted variables that
presumably explain why these regions have below-average incomes. The estimated
coefficient on the volume of aid is negative because this is the only way the specification
allows to assign to these territories a low steady-state level of income. But as soon as we
control for other factors, even by the simple expedient of introducing a set of regional
dummies, the positive impact of aid on growth becomes apparent.
A more sophisticated, although indirect, case against regional policies can be found in
some papers in the regional convergence literature (see Barro and Sala i Martin (1991) and
especially Sala i Martin (1996)). While these authors find that the speed of regional
convergence is very low in Europe and in other samples, they are also skeptical about
government's ability to speed up the process. The main piece of evidence they offer to back up
this conclusion is a remarkable empirical regularity: the apparent stability of the rate of
convergence, which has been found to be close to 2% a year in a variety of samples. According
to Sala i Martin, the fact that convergence takes place at practically the same speed within
groups of territories supposedly characterized by very different levels of redistributive effort
implies that such policies cannot be very effective.
This conclusion seems, however, much too hasty. Governments can certainly influence the
rate at which regions accumulate various productive factors - particularly infrastructures and
human capital. To the extent that these factors have an effect on productivity, and on the
location of mobile private inputs, there will be room for supply-side policies to influence the
dispersion of regional incomes and to promote or accelerate income convergence. From this
point of view, the stability of the convergence coefficient across different samples may
indicate that the level of redistributive effort has been too small to have a noticeable effect
on the evolution of income disparities, and/or that the policies adopted in the past have not
been very effective, but it cannot be taken as evidence that regional policy per se is
necessarily ineffective.
Can investment in infrastructures and education increase productivity?
Since EU regional policy has essentially taken the form of conditional grants for the
financing of training and infrastructure projects, the discussion about its effectiveness should
begin with an analysis of the contribution of these two types of investment expenditures to
productivity growth. Although the issue is, as we will see, somewhat controversial, I believe
that the existing evidence provides reasonable support for the view that expenditure on
4education can have a considerable effect on productivity growth, and that the same holds
true for infrastructure investment, at least in regions where the endowment of this factor is
relatively low.
Academic economists have traditionally been inclined to consider educational expenditure
a key component of national investment with a substantial economic payoff in terms of output
growth, and have often assigned to the accumulation of human capital a central role in formal
models, particularly in the recent literature on endogenous growth. This optimism seemed to
be confirmed by a first round of cross-country empirical studies of the determinants of growth,
where a variety of educational indicators were consistently found to have the expected
positive effect. A second round of such studies (characterized by the use of panel data
techniques), however, produced rather disappointing results and even led some researchers to
explicitly question the link between education and productivity.2 In recent years, the evidence
seems to be accumulating that such negative results were largely due to poor data and various
econometric problems. The current state of thinking about this issue is probably well
summarized by Temple (2000) who, after surveying the relevant micro and macroeconomic
evidence, concludes that "the weight of the evidence points to significant productivity
effects" of educational investment. Some recent work by R. Doménech and myself (2002) helps
support this conclusion. We find, in particular, that the amount of measurement error in the
educational data sets that have been used in most growth studies is very considerable and
that this induces a large downward bias in the estimated coefficient of human capital in the
aggregate production function. When this bias is corrected using an extension of the classical
errors-in-variables model, the results suggest that the contribution of educational investment
to productivity growth is quite sizable.
The degree of consensus on the productivity effects of infrastructure investment is probably
much smaller. The issue has been the subject of a debate that is still ongoing in the literature.
The available empirical evidence is problematic and its interpretation is complicated by
econometric problems that have not been fully solved yet. Early work on the subject, notably
by Aschauer (1989), concluded that the elasticity of national or regional output with respect
to public capital is large and very significant, and that the rate of return on public investment
is exceedingly high. A number of more recent studies, however, have questioned these results
on the basis of various econometric problems. Some of these studies find that the significance
of public capital disappears when a specification in first differences is used or fixed effects
are introduced to control for unobserved national or regional specificities, and conclude that
the accumulation of public capital does not appreciably contribute to productivity growth.
Other recent papers, by contrast, confirm the significance of infrastructure indicators using
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5cointegration or panel data techniques that should in principle take care of some of the main
objections to Aschauer's results. Some of them (especially Fernald (1999)) also provide rather
convincing evidence that causation runs from infrastructure investment to productivity
growth, and not the other way around.
De la Fuente (2002a) surveys the available evidence and concludes that there are
sufficient indications that public infrastructure investment contributes significantly to
productivity growth, at least in countries or regions where a saturation point has not been
reached. The returns to such investment are probably quite high when infrastructures are
scarce and basic networks have not been completed, but fall sharply thereafter. Hence,
appropriate infrastructure provision is probably a basic ingredient for a successful (regional or
national) development policy, even if it does not hold the key to rapid productivity growth
in advanced countries where transportation and communications needs are already
adequately served. This conclusion is based in part on a comparison of existing results for the
regions of Spain and the states of the US. Public capital variables are almost always
significant in panel data specifications for the Spanish regions, and often insignificant in
similar exercises conducted with US data. One possible explanation for this difference is
that, as Fernald (1999) notes, the existing data for the US states start in 1970, i.e. at
approximately the time when the interstate highway system was completed, whereas the
Spanish data refer to a sample where the stock of infrastructures is still clearly insufficient.
3. Some impact estimates for Spain
 Even though the existing evidence on the subject is not as clear as one would like, on the
whole, the literature that I have briefly surveyed in the previous section suggests that
investment in education and infrastructure is an important source of productivity growth. It
follows that a regional policy aimed at reducing regional disparities by supporting the
accumulation of these factors in poor regions can work in principle.
In this section I will provide some estimates of the impact of regional policies on growth
and convergence in the Spanish regions. These estimates are based on a simple supply-
oriented model that has been estimated with regional panel data covering a period of 30
years. The model has two basic ingredients. The first one is an aggregate production function
which relates regional output to the level of employment, the stocks of productive factors
(infrastructures, other physical capital and the educational attainment of the workforce) and
to the level of technical efficiency. The second component of the model is an employment
equation which describes the evolution of this variable as a function of changes in factor
stocks and in wage rates, allowing in an ad-hoc fashion for adjustment costs that generate
sluggish dynamics.3 I will also make use on an investment function estimated with national
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6data for a sample of OECD countries to try to approximate the response of private investment
to the measures financed by the Structural Funds.4
Figure 1: Beta convergence/divergence in relative income per capita
induced by investment in productive infrastructures
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Before turning to the Structural Funds per se, I want to take a quick look at the evolution of
Spanish infrastructure policy over the last four decades. The model I have sketched above
can be used to estimate the contribution of infrastructure investment to convergence in income
per capita across the Spanish regions. Figure 1 summarizes the results of this calculation for
each quinquennium between 1955 and 1995.5 It shows that Spanish infrastructure investment
was not redistributive at all prior to 1980. After this date, by contrast, the redistributive
pattern is clear and the contribution to regional convergence becomes positive and sizable.
Although the policy shift actually starts a bit before Spain's accession to the EU (which took
place in 1986), there is little question that the Structural Funds have played a key role in it
by channeling a large volume of infrastructure investment into lagging regions.
The effects of the 1994-99 Objective 1 CSF
In the remainder of this section I will use the same model to produce estimates of the
contribution of the last completed Community Support Framework (CSF) to the growth of
output and employment in the poorer Spanish regions.6 The exercise is based on the
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7assumption that investment projects that are cofinanced by the EU are no different from
others of the same nature. This assumption may be a bit too optimistic because, by reducing
marginal costs, EU subsidies may have made for somewhat laxer project selection standards
than otherwise, but I am reasonably confident that it is not a bad approximation.
The calculations that follow attempt to quantify the contribution of all the public
resources chanelled through the CSF (including national co-financing as well as EU grants)
and of the induced change in private investment to growth in output and employment during
the period 1994-2000. The calculation involves adding these flows of resources to observed
1993 factor stocks and using the estimated production and employment functions to calculate
the resulting increase in the variables of interest over their observed values in the reference
year. The results should be interpreted with caution because (among many other things) they
do not provide a valid response to the question of what would have happened if the
Structural Funds had not existed. To answer this question, we would need to know how the
Spanish administrations would have reacted to the loss of these funds. It is almost certain
that they would have made up at least part of the loss using their own budgets, but it is hard
to be more precise. As a rough adjustment for this and for the fact that the CSF also includes
national resources, I would suggest multiplying my impact estimates by around 1/2 to get a
guesstimate of the true marginal contribution of EU cohesion policy.
Figure 2: Cumulative impact of the 1994-99 CSF on factor stocks
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Figures 2 and 3 show the cumulative impact of the CSF on the stocks of productive factors
and on the levels of output and employment of the entire set of Objective 1 regions (excluding
Ceuta and Melilla) during the period 1994-2015. Figure 2 shows that the CSF can be seen as a
large positive "shock" that, over a period of seven years, raises aggregate factor stocks
8significantly above their starting levels (up to 20% in the case of infrastructures). Once the
Framework has been executed (and assuming there are no new interventions), the stocks of
physical capital and infrastructures are allowed to gradually return to their original levels
as CSF-financed investments depreciate. The impact on the stock of human capital, by
contrast, remains constant until the end of the working life of the beneficiaries of training
programmes which, on average, will take place after the end of the period covered in the
figure.
Figure 3: Cumulative impact of the 1994-99 CSF on output and employment
entire Objective 1 territory
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Figure 3 traces out the impact of these shocks on the evolution of output and employment.
As may be expected, the output effect has approximately the same profile as factor stocks,
and begins to decline as soon as the Framework has been completely executed. The time path
of employment, on the other hand, is very different from the previous one. Since this variable
adjusts sluggishly over time, net job creation remains positive until about 15 years after the
conclusion of the programming period.
Figure 4 summarizes the cumulative impact of the Framework on the output and
employment of each of the Objective 1 regions in 2000. The figure shows that the growth
effects of the CSF vary significantly across territories, reflecting differences in both the
volume of investment and in its rate of return. For the Objective 1 regions as a whole, the
Framework adds 6.9 percentage points to output and 3.4 points to employment in 2000. When
we take as our reference the entire country, the CSF's cumulative contributions to Spanish
growth and employment in the same year are of 3.5 and 1.85 points respectively.
Figure 5 quantifies the Framework's contribution to convergence in income per capita
between Objective 1 regions and the rest of the country. It shows a convergence ratio that
9measures the fraction of the original income gap that would have disappeared as a result of
the execution of the Framework (if the population of the different regions had remained
constant over the sample period and growth performance had been uniform across them except
for the effects of the CSF). For the whole of the Objective 1 territory, this coefficient is a bit
over 20%, and reaches values above 30% for Canarias, Cantabria and Galicia.
Figure 4: Cumulative impact of the CSF in 2000
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Figure 5: Convergence ratios induced by the CSF
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4. Cohesion across countries or across regions?
The estimates I have presented in the previous section suggest that structural policies
have worked quite well in Spain. They have, in particular, contributed significantly to the
growth of the poorer regions and to the reduction of regional disparities. It must be recognized,
however, that focusing on lagging regions entails a sizable efficiency cost and may not be
optimal from a national perspective. Figure 6 shows why. The estimated returns on public
investment are much higher in some of the richest Spanish regions than in most of the
territories that are eligible for assistance under Objective 1. It follows that the overall
impact of EU aid would have been considerably higher (and Spain's convergence toward
average EU income correspondingly faster) if efficiency considerations had been given greater
weight in the allocation of these funds.
Figure 6: Relative marginal product of infrastructures in the Spanish regions, 1995
-50
0
25
50
75
100
Cana Va
Ga
Mu
Cant CyL An As
Ex C-M
Ma Ba Cat PV
Na Ar Ri
-25
NON-OBJECTIVE 1 REGIONS
OBJECTIVE 1 REGIONS   
         - Note: percentage deviations from the national average.
I am not sure that shifting structural assistance towards the richer regions of the cohesion
countries is necessarily optimal, as this would certainly entail some cost in the form of greater
internal inequality in output per capita. On the other hand, this cost will be substantially
mitigated by the operation of the standard mechanisms for personal redistribution that
opearate within (but not across) countries. The social protection and tax systems of European
countries will redirect a significant part of any income gains from more efficient investment
policies towards the poorer segments of the population. For the case of Spain, I have
estimated that a policy shift in this direction would generate a net welfare gain.7 This may
not be the case elsewhere, but I would argue that member countries should certainly be free to
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distribute EU development funds across regions as they see fit, after weighting the relevant
costs and benefits. Or, to put it in a slightly different way, that cohesion policy should be
formulated at the national rather than at the regional level because member countries have
adequate mechanisms for internal redistribution.
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